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1 |  INTRODUCTION
Do central banks follow policies that are in line with the ideological preferences of the government? 
According to Goodman (1992: 4–5): “Political parties that win elections are often said to favor those 
economic policies which reflect the economic interests of their core constituencies. According to this 
view, conservative parties will pursue more restrictive policies to achieve lower rates of inflation, 
Received: 28 December 2017 | Revised: 5 July 2018 | Accepted: 13 September 2018
DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12126
O R I G I N A L  A R T I C L E
The influence of government ideology on monetary 
policy: New cross- country evidence based on 
dynamic heterogeneous panels
Federico M. Giesenow1  | Jakob de Haan1,2,3
1University of Groningen, Groningen, The 
Netherlands




Federico M. Giesenow, University of 
Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands.
Email: f.m.giesenow@rug.nl
Abstract
Using data of 23 OECD countries over the 1980–2005 pe-
riod, we examine whether government ideology affects 
monetary policy, conditional on central bank independ-
ence. Unlike previous studies in this line of literature, we 
estimate central bank behavior using forward- looking and 
real- time data in Taylor rule models and use estimators 
that allow for heterogeneity across countries. Our models 
with heterogeneous slope coefficients for the full sample 
do not suggest partisan effects. We also do not find evi-
dence that central bank behavior is conditioned by the in-
teraction of the ideology of the incumbent government and 
the electoral calendar.
J E L  C L A S S I F I C A T I O N
E52, E58, D72, C23
K E Y W O R D S
Central Bank Independence, ideology, monetary policy, partisan theory
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution 
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.
© 2019 The Authors Economics & Politics Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
   | 217GIESENOW aNd DE HaaN
while left- wing parties will pursue more expansionary policies to achieve lower rates of unemploy-
ment.1 “… In countries with dependent central banks, governments play a significant role in setting 
monetary policy. As a consequence, monetary policy can be influenced by … the identity of the party 
in control of government…. In countries with independent central banks, on the other hand, govern-
ments have, by definition, little influence over the formulation of monetary policy. … All other things 
being equal, independent central banks are both more able and more likely than are dependent central 
banks to resist any domestic political pressure for greater monetary expansion.”2
Even though central banks in many countries have been designed to minimize political influences 
on monetary policy decision- making, these protections are generally not perfect so that government 
ideology may impact central banks’ policies (Chappell, 2004). Furthermore, politicians can change 
legislation on central bank independence (CBI). In the United States, for instance, senator Rand Paul 
recently reintroduced his proposal to let the Government Accountability Office review the Federal 
Reserve’s monetary policy. The Fed strongly opposes the bill, arguing that it would subject monetary 
policy- makers to excessive political pressure. However, the bill may become a reality as Republicans, 
who are overwhelming critical of the Federal Reserve, now control both the House and the Senate.
Several studies have examined the influence of the U.S. administration on the policies of the 
Federal Reserve. In his seminal contribution, Havrilesky (1995) argues that presidential influence 
over monetary policy derives in part from the Fed’s need to deflect Congressional threats to its inde-
pendence. In return for protection from the president, the Fed will accommodate presidential wishes. 
The evidence of Havrilesky (1988, 1995) suggests that the Fed was responsive to executive branch 
signals of monetary policy preferences. An alternative channel through which politicians may influ-
ence monetary policy is through the power of appointment (Chang, 2001; Chappell, Havrilesky, & 
McGregor, 1993; Havrilesky & Gildea, 1991; and Schnakenberg, Turner, & Uribe- McGuire, 2017). 
By appointing political allies in the Federal Reserve Board, the president may try to redirect monetary 
policy in line with his preferences.
In contrast to the prediction of partisan theory, several studies report evidence that short- term inter-
est rates tend to be higher during left- wing governments (Boix, 2000; Clark, 2003; Sakamoto, 2008). 
Boix (2000) and Clark (2003) suggest that left- wing governments follow a tighter monetary policy 
in order to convince investors or public opinion of their commitment to fight inflation. By following 
atypical policies, the government aims to earn credibility in line with the “When Does it Take a Nixon 
1Goodman refers here to partisan theory (Hibbs, 1977). According to this theory, right- wing governments care more (less) 
about inflation (unemployment) than left- wing governments, in line with the interests of their respective constituencies. Within 
a rational expectations framework with optimizing subjects and in the context of election uncertainty, differences between left- 
and right- wing governments will only be temporary and show up shortly after the elections (Alesina, 1987; Alesina & Sachs, 
1988). Of course, right- wing and left- wing governments may differ along several other dimensions as well, like taxes and 
regulation. Potrafke (2017) provides a comprehensive review of the empirical evidence on partisan politics in OECD panel 
studies. See also Cahan, Lorenz, and Potrafke (2017) for an extensive discussion of panel and single- country studies on the 
impact of ideology on monetary policy. Although several central banks in our sample have become inflation targeters, this does 
not imply that partisan factors have become irrelevant; the reason is that inflation targeting does not imply that central banks 
only care about inflation (Samarina & de Haan, 2014). 
2As argued by de Haan, Bodea, Hicks, and Eijffinger (2018), the economic case for CBI rests on countering inflationary biases 
that may occur for various reasons in the absence of an independent central bank. One reason for such a bias is political pressure 
to boost output in the short run for electoral reasons. Another reason is the incentive for politicians to use the central bank’s 
power to issue money as a means to finance government spending. The inflationary bias can also result from the time- 
inconsistency problem of monetary policy- making. In a nutshell, this is the problem that policy- makers are not credible, that is, 
they have an incentive to renege in the future on their promise made today to keep inflation low. As people are aware of this 
temptation, they have higher inflation expectations, which would lead to higher inflation without any gains in employment or 
output. By delegating monetary policy to an independent and conservative (i.e., inflation averse) central bank, promises to keep 
inflation low are more credible. 
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to Go to China” idea of Cukierman and Tommasi (1998). Sakamoto (2008) provides another expla-
nation, arguing that lack of control over the central bank incentivizes left- wing governments to use 
expansionary fiscal policy, which, in turn, forces independent central banks to increase interest rates.
Belke and Potrafke (2012) estimated a dynamic fixed effects panel model using quarterly data over 
1980–2005 of 23 developed countries. Their analysis is based on estimates of (backward- looking) 
Taylor rules (Taylor, 1993), incorporating central bank independence and government ideology. Belke 
and Potrafke (2012) provide support for traditional partisan effects conditional on CBI: short- term 
interest rates are lower during a left- wing government when the central bank is not independent. 
However, under independent central banks and left- wing governments, interest rates are higher.
Clark and Arel- Bundock (2013) argue that conservative central bankers behave as conditional 
inflation hawks because doing so can result in the (re)election of political principals that more closely 
share their low- inflation preferences. Their evidence for the United States, based on estimates of a 
(partly forward- looking) Taylor rule, suggests that when Democrats control the White House the 
Fed increases interest rates in response to increased inflationary expectations, especially as elections 
approach, but it is insensitive to higher inflationary expectations under a Republican administration.
Several previous studies (including Belke & Potrafke, 2012 and Cahan et al., 2017) assume that 
monetary authorities only consider backward- looking information about output and inflation when 
taking policy decisions. Indeed, the standard procedure in macroeconomic and political science liter-
ature on modeling economic policies has been to use the latest available data. However, as pointed out 
by Croushore (2011), this approach is based on the heroic assumptions that data are immediately 
available (when in fact they are generally available only with a lag) and that data revisions either do 
not exist or are inconsequentially small (when in fact they are often large and may significantly affect 
empirical results).3 Indeed, the main reason why estimates of the Taylor rule based on ex post, 
backward- looking data deviate from those based on real- time, forward- looking data is revisions in the 
estimates of the output gap.4 In addition, monetary policy instruments (such as the policy interest rate) 
only affect central bank target variables (such as output and inflation) with substantial delay, making 
the use of backward- looking information suboptimal. Several studies have shown that central banks 
are forward looking (see, for instance, Clarida, Galí, & Gertler, 1998; Orphanides, 2001; Svensson, 
2003; Gorter et al., 2008; and Blinder, Ehrmann, de Haan, Fratzscher, & Jansen, 2008).
This paper examines the influence of governments’ ideology on the actions of central banks for a 
large sample of OECD countries, conditional on the level of central bank independence. Our first 
contribution is that, unlike previous studies which mostly used backward- looking and ex post data in 
modeling central bank behavior, our preferred models are based on real time, forward looking data for 
the reasons outlined above. These forward- looking data have not been subject to posterior adjustments 
and/or revisions. We estimate panel models using data of 23 OECD countries over the 1980–2005 
period for several reasons. First, real- time data are not available for a sufficiently long period for most 
countries and, second, there is not sufficient variation in partisan factors and CBI over time to identify 
conditional partisan influences in single- country models. Indeed, for the latter reason several previous 
3This is nicely illustrated by Orphanides (2001) who finds that estimated policy reaction functions for the Federal Reserve 
based on ex post data yield misleading descriptions of the Fed’s policy- making. Models based on real- time Federal Reserve 
staff forecasts describe policy better than comparable Taylor- type specifications based on ex post data. This is further exempli-
fied by the work of Gorter, Jacobs, and de Haan (2008), who report similar results for the ECB’s policies. 
4An interesting analysis of data revisions is the study by De Castro, Perez, and Rodríguez- Vives (2013) who examine revisions 
in government budget deficit data for European Union member states. They find that initially released government deficit data 
are biased and nonefficient predictors of subsequent releases, with later vintages of data tending to show larger deficits on av-
erage. Furthermore, their results suggest that governments tend to conceal deficits in electoral and pre- electoral years. 
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studies also used panel data. By focusing on the sample period 1980–2005, we make our analysis 
comparable with previous research, notably the study of Belke and Potrafke (2012).5
However, the use of panel models may cause some problems, the most important one being that it 
may not be correct to assume that the same data- generating process exists in all countries, especially 
when countries with dissimilar economic and institutional characteristics as Greece and Switzerland 
are included in the sample (Pesaran & Smith, 1995).6 This is where the second major contribution of 
our paper comes in. We employ techniques that allow taking this heterogeneity across countries into 
account. Our results cast serious doubts on the presence of partisan effects in monetary policy. When 
the full sample is used and heterogeneous slope coefficients are allowed for, we do not find an associ-
ation between government ideology and monetary policy.
Our third contribution is that we follow a similar approach as Clark and Arel- Bundock (2013) and 
examine whether conservative central bankers adjust interest rates strategically before elections. Our 
results do not provide strong evidence for this view neither.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief description of the 
data used. Section 3 describes the empirical approach. Section 4 shows the findings for models sim-
ilar to those of Belke and Potrafke (2012) which include interactions between CBI and government 
ideology. Section 5 tests the hypothesis of Clark and Arel- Bundock (2013) that central banks react 
differently to inflation expectations under left- and right- wing governments, again conditioning for 
CBI. Section 6 offers the conclusions.
2 |  DATA
The dependent variable is the short- term interest rate, which in most cases consists of the annualized 
3- month contemporaneous interest rate, and is obtained from the OECD’s online database.7 This also 
holds for other economic data. Forward- looking data, that is, forecasts for annualized real GDP growth 
and inflation, have been collected from Consensus Economics. As one of the world’s leading eco-
nomic survey organizations in the world, this firm surveys more than 700 economists and institutions 
each month to obtain its predictions. This source provides a more consistent and methodologically 
homogeneous set of information than using each central bank’s own forecasts, which in many cases 
are not available for the time period and frequency considered in our study. Central banks frequently 
take these forecasts into account when taking monetary policy decisions (Gorter et al., 2008). We 
therefore use these data as proxy for real- time central bank forecasts. Consensus Economics provides 
monthly figures. Following the methodology presented in Gorter et al. (2008), these figures are trans-
formed as follows. For any month m of a given year t, the 1- year forecast for a given variable is com-
puted as (13 − m)/12 times the forecast for year t plus (m − 1)/12 times the forecast for year t + 1. 
5In addition, focusing on this sample period avoids incorporating the noise of the 2007/8 financial crisis and the period of the 
Effective Lower Bound (ELB) in the dataset. Furthermore, it also minimizes the degree to which the panel is unbalanced due 
to the inclusion of countries in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
6Cahan et al. (2017) go even so far as to argue that panel models for OECD countries do not identify causal effects of govern-
ment ideology on monetary policies, and there is no suitable research design to do so. Therefore, the authors survey the histor-
ical evidence on each country. Our position is that OECD panel models may be useful for the issue at hand, provided properly 
specified central bank reaction functions are estimated and heterogeneity is considered. 
7Available at http://stats.oecd.org. We use money market rates instead of policy rates as the latter not only infrequently change 
but also because monetary policy is more than changes in policy rates. Notably open market operations are an integral part of 
monetary policy and their impact is reflected in money market rates. Having said that, also other factors than monetary policy 
may affect money market rates, but it is widely believed that the main driver of changes in the money market rate is monetary 
policy. 
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Subsequently, these values have been averaged into quarterly figures to match the periodicity of other 
data used. Forward- looking Taylor rules normally contain forecasts of the future output gap (cf. 
Svensson, 1997, 2003). However, Consensus Economics does not publish such forecasts. We there-
fore follow the approach suggested by Gorter et al. (2008) to obtain a proxy for this forward- looking 
variable. Trend GDP growth rate is first estimated for each country, and then this value is subtracted 
from the expected GDP growth rate to obtain the output gap.8 In our analysis we also use ex post data 
to compare our findings with those of previous studies. The ex post output gap is obtained by applying 
the Hodrick–Prescott filter to real output.9 Inflation is proxied by the change in the consumer price 
index (CPI).
The index of government ideology is from Potrafke (2009).10 This index categorizes countries’ 
governments on a right- to- left scale that ranges from 1, indicating the presence of a strong right- wing 
ideology, to a value of 5, showing a strong left- wing administration. If the country’s government con-
sists of a centrist party, or a balanced coalition of both right- and left- wing parties, the index takes a 
value of 3. For periods with alternating governments with different ideologies, the index has a value 
according to the ideology of the government that spent more days in office. Data on CBI come from 
Arnone, Laurens, Sommer, and Segalotto (2007) and the updates thereof provided by Klomp and de 
Haan (2009).11 Following Belke and Potrafke (2012), we use a measure of central bank dependence 
(CBD), which is the inverse of the CBI variable, which ranges between 0 (low dependence) and 1 
(high dependence). Furthermore, whenever the analysis incorporates simultaneously the variables 
CBD, ideology, and the interaction term between these two, all variables are normalized with a mean 
of zero and variance of one to allow direct interpretation of the resulting coefficients.
The quarterly backward- looking data used to perform a poolability (homogeneity) test is available 
for 23 developed countries covering the years of 1980Q4 to 2005Q4. The countries in our sample are: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. However, for a group of countries specific events 
limit the use of all the historical information available: for Germany, the data considered only covers the 
period after Reunification (1991Q1), and for countries that joined the European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) the information is restricted to the period in which these countries still had their own 
monetary policy.12 In the analysis based on forward- looking data, the sample is reduced to 21 countries 
(there are no Consensus forecasts available for Iceland and Luxembourg). The sample periods are also 
smaller. Forecasts for inflation and real GDP growth in Greece are only available from 1993Q2, and 
forecasts for both Australia and New Zealand are not published in the original source after 1994Q3. In 
most cases, the quarterly forecasts range from 1989Q4 to 2005Q4. Descriptive statistics of variables 
included in the backward- and forward- looking models are presented in Appendix A.13
8Trend GDP growth is the geometric average obtained from the historical real GDP growth series (based on annual data re-
trieved from the OECD’s database for 1980–2005). 
9Lambda used = 1600. 
10The data were generously provided by Niklas Potrafke. 
11Table A3 in Appendix A shows that in our sample CBI varies substantially, both across countries and over time. de Haan et al. 
(2018) show that even though CBI increased notably in most countries during the 1990s, CBI differs substantially across 
countries. 
12Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain joined the EMU in 1999. 
Greece became a member in 2001. For Greece we only consider data until the last quarter of 2000. 
13We use the Im- Pesaran- Shin (IPS) test and Fisher- type tests to investigate the presence of unit roots and Westerlund’s error 
correction- based tests to examine panel cointegration. The results suggest the presence of a long- run relationship between the 
variables considered. These results are available in the Supporting information Appendix S1. 
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3 |  EMPIRICAL APPROACH
Central bank policies are represented by a Taylor rule, which models the behavior of short- term nomi-
nal interest rates by taking the output gap and the rate of inflation into account (Taylor, 1993).14 The 
model also includes a one- period lag of the short- term interest rate as explanatory variable to reflect 
the interest rate smoothing behavior of central banks (English, Nelson, & Sack, 2002). In addition, the 
model incorporates variables that represent government ideology, central bank dependence (CBD), 
and the interaction between these last two terms (cf. Belke & Potrafke, 2012).
Following previous studies, we first assume a backward- looking central bank. The following 
model is estimated:
Rit=훽1Ri,t−1+훽2IDit+훽3CBDit+훽4Πit+훽5Yit+훽6(ID×CBD)it+휂t+휇i+휀it,
where, Rit is the short- term nominal interest rate in country i (i = 1, 2, …, N) during period t (t = 1, 
2, …, T), while IDit measures the political ideology of the government, CBD is the index for central 
bank dependence, Πit is inflation, and Yit is an indicator of the output gap. The model includes country 
fixed effects, µi, to capture individual unobserved time- invariant factors that influence interest rates. 
Time fixed effects, ηt, are also part of the model. The disturbances 휀it are assumed to be independently 
distributed across groups.
Next, we estimate a Taylor rule model under the assumption of a forward- looking central bank. In 
this case the model is:
Rit=훽1Ri,t−1+훽2IDit+훽3CBDit+훽4E(Π)it+훽5E(Y)it+훽6(ID×CBD)it+휂t+휇i+휀it,
where, E(Π)it and E(Y)it are the 12- months ahead forecasts of inflation and the output gap available at 
time t, respectively. The other variables have the same meaning as in Equation 1.
The presence of a partisan effect on monetary policy implies a negative marginal effect of ideology, 
but this effect may be conditional on the level of CBD. The expected sign for the slope coefficients β4 
and β5 is positive, while the smoothing parameter (β1) is expected to be positive and smaller than one.
Due to the presence of a lagged dependent variable (Rit - 1) as regressor, traditional panel fixed- 
effect estimators are biased (Nickell, 1981). When the number of cross- sectional units is small, alter-
native Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators such as the one proposed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) are also biased. Kiviet (1995) and Judson and Owen 
(1999) provide evidence in favor of using the least squares dummy variable estimator instead, mainly 
due to its smaller relative variance. Therefore, we employ Bruno’s (2005) least squares dummy vari-
able corrected (LSDVC) estimation routine for dynamic panels (see also Belke & Potrafke, 2012).15
14In the Taylor rule model, nominal policy rates are assumed to be driven by the long- run equilibrium real (or natural) interest 
rate, the gap between inflation and the central bank’s inflation objective, and the output gap, that is,, the deviation of actual and 
potential output, expressed as a percentage of the latter. Taylor suggested particular values for the natural rate and the parame-
ters for the inflation and output gap. Several studies have found that in recent years, actual policy rates fell below those implied 
by this particular formulation of the Taylor rule. Hofmann and Bogdanova (2012) have argued that deviations of policy rates 
from those implied by the normative Taylor rule can be best interpreted as a change in the global equilibrium real (or natural) 
interest rate. Several studies suggest that the natural rate has declined (see, for instance, Laubach & Williams, 2015; Belke & 
Klose, 2017). In our analysis, the Taylor rule model is used as a central bank reaction function, that is, to describe central bank 
behavior, and we therefore do not impose values for the parameters on the inflation and the output gap but estimate them. 
(1)
(2)
15This estimation procedure extends the bias approximation formulas in Bun and Kiviet (2003) to accommodate unbalanced 
panels with a strictly exogenous selection rule. Flannery and Hankins (2013) show that compared to other estimators, LSDVC 
appears to be the best choice in case of endogenous regressors. 
222 |   GIESENOW aNd DE HaaN
Past empirical research on the influence of ideology on monetary policy mainly used fixed effect 
panels or similar pooled estimation methods. However, using pooled estimators when the homogene-
ity assumption does not hold will result in biased estimates of the slope coefficients. This also holds 
for the LSDVC estimator. Ignoring cross- country heterogeneity induces serial correlation in the dis-
turbance term. This problem is present even if T goes to infinity (Pesaran & Smith, 1995). When T is 
sufficiently large so that separate regressions for each country can be run, the homogeneity assump-
tion can be verified using the test proposed by Baltagi (2008) and adapted to a dynamic framework in 





where SSEr is the sum of squared residuals of a two- stage least squares (2SLS) regression that assumes 
common intercepts and common slopes, SSEu is the sum of squared residuals of a 2SLS regression 
that allows for both varying intercepts and slopes, and q and dfu are the number of restrictions and the 
degrees of freedom of the unrestricted model, respectively.
To assess the suitability of pooling, we first perform this test on data for the same period and 
relationships considered in Belke and Potrafke (2012) as these authors provide the most comprehen-
sive panel estimations using backward- looking data. Their analysis covers 23 OECD countries from 
1980 to 2005. The null hypothesis of homogeneity is rejected at the 1% confidence level as shown in 
Appendix B.
An intuitive approach to deal with the problem of cross- country heterogeneity (i.e., differences in 
the data- generating process across countries) is to find a subsample of countries that is sufficiently 
similar. As a first step, we therefore split the sample in countries with above and below- average infla-
tion.16 Baltagi’s poolability test indicates that when dealing with backward- looking information, the 
group of 16 countries with below- average inflation have homogeneous slope coefficients (Appendix B). 
These countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.
Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999) propose alternatives to the pooled 
approach that can deal with cross- country heterogeneity, namely the mean group (MG) estimator and 
the pooled mean group estimator (PMG).17 We apply these approaches for our preferred forward- 
looking specification of the Taylor rule. The MG estimator can be explained as follows. Take the fol-





where Rit is a vector with observations of the short- term interest rate and xit is a vector of exogenous 
regressors that includes (the forecasts of) inflation and the output gap, and the other variables specified 
in Equation 2. Notably, 휆i and βi are varying across groups according to the following specification:
휆
i
= 휆 + 휉1i , 훽i = 훽 + 휉2i,
where 휉1i and 휉2i are assumed to have zero means and constant covariances. As such, this is a standard 
formulation of the RCM, and it introduces heterogeneity in the parameters through the ‘short- term’ 
16Using the interest rate variable to split the sample also generates a cluster with homogeneous coefficients, but the number of 
countries in this group is smaller. 
17Other estimators for heterogeneous panels, such as the ‘shrinkage’ estimator suggested by Maddala, Srivastava, and Li 
(1994), lack the property of distinguishing between short- run and long- run effects. We leave it for future research to consider 
these alternative estimators. 
(3)
(4)
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coefficients 휆i and 훽i. If the sample is large enough, then the mean of the long- run effects 휃i=훽i∕(1−휆i), 
denoted ?̄?, becomes the appropriate measure of the average long- run effect.
The PMG estimator allows estimating a common long- run relationship without assuming similar 
dynamics in each country (Pesaran et al., 1999). We follow the approach suggested by these authors, 
which starts by assuming an autoregressive distributed lag dynamic (ARDL) panel specification, 
ARDL(p, q1, q2, …, qz), where p refers to the number of lags of Rit, q is the number of lags of the 











where xit is a vector of exogenous regressors for group i as defined in Equation 2, the 휆ij are scalars 
and the rest of the variables have the usual interpretation. To keep the notation simple, no time fixed 
effects are included in Equation 5. If the variables in Equation 2 are cointegrated, then the error term 














































훿im with j=1, 2,… , q−1. The parameter 휙i is 
the error- correcting speed and if 𝜙i<0 then a long- run relationship between Rit and xit exists and is 














where 휐it is a stationary process, and the long- run coefficients defined by the 휃i are the same across 
countries. Pesaran et al. (1999) use a maximum likelihood approach to estimate this model.
Finally, a Hausman test is performed to decide whether the MG or the PMG estimator is to be 
preferred.18
4 |  RESULTS: PARTISAN EFFECTS CONDITIONAL ON 
CENTRAL BANK DEPENDENCE
4.1 | Homogeneous sample
Table 1 presents the estimates of Equations 1 and 2 using Bruno’s bias- corrected least squares dummy 
variables estimator. The first three columns show estimations of Equation 1 using different samples 
and the fourth column presents the estimation results of Equation 2. In particular, the first column 
shows the results for a backward- looking monetary policy model similar to models estimated by 
Belke and Potrafke (2012) for the complete sample of 23 countries. Although the poolability test 
18The PMG estimator constrains the long- run elasticities to be equal across all panels. This “pooling” across countries yields 
efficient and consistent estimates when the restrictions are true. If the true model is homogeneous, the PMG estimates are con-
sistent and more efficient. MG estimates are consistent in either case but are only efficient if the true model is heterogeneous 
(Blackburne & Frank, 2007). If the true model were homogeneous, we could have faced the problem that two sets of consistent 
estimators would be available. However, in our case, heterogeneity prevails and the MG approach provides the only set of 
consistent and efficient estimators. More methodological details are available in Appendix E. 
(5)
(6)
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(Appendix B) suggests that it is likely that the estimated coefficients of this model are not homogene-
ous across countries, and are hence inconsistent, we start with this model to serve as a benchmark.19 
The second column shows the results for the backward- looking model using the sample of 16 coun-
tries having similar inflation rates and for which the poolability test indicates the presence of homo-
geneous slope coefficients.20 The main difference between the first and the second column is therefore 
the number of countries considered. In column (3) also Luxembourg is dropped, as forward- looking 
information is not available for this country, and the time period is adjusted to match the characteris-
tics of the forward- looking sample available. The results in column (3) can then be compared with 
those in column (4), which shows the outcomes for the Taylor rule model using real- time (1- year) 
forecasts of inflation and the output gap.21 For the forward- looking model, the poolability test indi-
cates homogeneous slope coefficients at the 1% confidence level (Appendix B).
Similar to the results reported in most other papers discussed in section 1, all models shown in 
Table 1 deviate from the ‘Taylor principle’ (Taylor, 1993). In a nutshell, this means that the long- term 
coefficient on inflation should be larger than 1 for monetary policy to have a stabilizing impact on 
inflation. A potential explanation why this principle does not hold is that the period considered in this 
analysis largely coincides with the ‘great moderation’, which was a period of low and stable inflation. 
In that sense, it may just reflect central banks’ success in keeping inflation stable and low over the 
period considered. In the absence of major movements in inflation, the reaction of interest rates to 
inflation might simply have become more difficult to pin down with any great precision (Hofmann & 
Bogdanova, 2012). Alternatively, it might suggest misspecification of the models used (see section 
4.2 for further details).
The effect of ideology on the short- term interest rate is, ceteris paribus, only significantly differ-
ent from zero when a forward- looking central bank is considered (first line, last column, in Table 1). 
However, to measure the complete effect of ideology on the interest rate, the marginal effect has to 
be computed and evaluated at different levels of CBD. The marginal effects for the homogeneous 
backward- looking models shown in Table 2 (columns 2 and 3) suggest that interest rates are higher 
under left- wing administrations when the central is bank is highly independent. These results confirm 
Sakamoto’s (2008) proposition and Belke and Potrafke’s (2012) finding that—within the context of a 
backward- looking Taylor rule and homogeneous panel model—interest rates are lower under a left- 
wing government if the central bank is strongly dependent.
However, if monetary policy is modeled in a forward- looking manner, the results deviate from the 
findings of previous studies on partisan effects in monetary policy (column 4). At high levels of central 
bank dependence, no statistically significant effect of ideology on interest rates is found. But at average 
levels of CBD the effect is positive and it gets larger in size and statistical significance the less depen-
dent the central bank is. At a minimum degree of dependence, an increase in the ideology index of one 
standard deviation (i.e., the government becomes more leftist) will raise the interest rate by almost 0.2 
percentage points. To put this result in perspective, if the control of the government changes from a right- 
wing to a left- wing party after elections, interest rates will be expected to rise more than 0.4 percentage 
points on average. Due to the homogeneity assumption, the absolute size of this change is expected to 
19Appendix C confirms that the results of the model shown in column (1) of Table 1 are sensitive to the exclusion of countries. 
Belke and Potrafke (2012) report similar results. 
20Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
21Even when considering the same periods and countries, differences in the availability of backward and forward- looking data 
explain the difference in the number of observations between columns 3 and 4. Further adjustments to the sample were made 
in order to obtain exactly the same number of observations as in Belke and Potrafke (2012). This does not change our conclu-
sions as shown in Appendix D. 
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be the same in each country. Countries with lower average interest rates will suffer larger proportional 
changes than countries with historically higher interest rates. This result is rather implausible.
4.2 | Forward- looking heterogeneous sample
An alternative to consider only subsamples of countries with homogeneous coefficients can be to 
use estimators that allow for nonhomogeneous slope coefficients. The mean group (MG) estimator 
assumes that the slope coefficients are different across all cross sections. The MG estimation is con-
ducted using an error correction specification (Equation 6). The pooled mean group (PMG) estimator 
imposes homogeneity on the slope coefficients of the long- run relationship only, while allowing for 
short- run heterogeneity.
T A B L E  2  Marginal effect of ideology on interest rates for different levels of central bank dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Backward- looking I 
(heterogeneous)






Minimum CBD 0.117 (0.078) 0.182*** (0.065) 0.165*** (0.064) 0.192*** (0.045)
Average CBD −0.018 (0.035) −0.008 (0.029) 0.015 (0.027) 0.062* (0.032)
Maximum CBD −0.109* (0.055) −0.160** (0.066) −0.147** (0.063) −0.078 (0.054)
Notes. See notes to Table 1. The table shows the marginal effect of ideology of the regressions shown in Table 1. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Statistical significance: *significant at 10%; **at 5%; ***at 1%.










Ideology −0.018 −0.007 0.015 0.064**
Central Bank 
Dependence (CBD)
0.164*** 0.120*** 0.162*** 0.151***
CBD*Ideology −0.063** −0.096*** −0.089*** −0.079***
(Expected) Output 
gap
0.122*** 0.141*** 0.139*** 0.058*
(Expected) Inflation 0.111*** 0.072*** 0.022 0.068
Lagged Dep. Var. 0.786*** 0.855*** 0.882*** 0.883***
Fixed country effects Y Y Y Y
Fixed time effects Y Y Y Y
Period 1980/2005 1980/2005 1989/2005 1989/2005
Observations 1,884 1,383 787 742
Number of countries 23 16 15 15
Notes. Dependent variable: short- term interest rate (annualized quarterly percentage). CBD is central bank dependence (ranging from 0 
to 1), Ideology ranges from 1(strong right) to 5 (strong left), Output gap is the annualized percentage long- term GDP growth gap, and 
Inflation is the annualized quarterly consumer inflation rate. Regressions estimated using Bruno’s bias- corrected least squares dummy 
variables estimator. Ideology and central bank dependence are interacted (normalized). Statistical significance: *significant at 10%; 
**at 5%; ***at 1%.
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This approach has not been used before to examine the relationship between ideology and mon-
etary policy, but has been employed in other lines of research (Klomp & de Haan, 2013; Pesaran 
et al., 1999). Since in reality central banks use forecasts to take decisions, this part of the analysis 
focuses on forward- looking Taylor rule models. As explained in the previous section, the PMG 
estimation corresponds to an ARDL specification. We limit the number of lags in this specification 
to a minimum. This is not only closer to a Taylor rule than other specifications of ARDL models 
but also allows limiting the number of parameters to be estimated. A common lag structure across 
countries is also imposed. Table 3 presents the results for the long- run coefficients only.22
For each estimation, the long- term coefficients as shown in the first column result from the estima-
tion of the error correction models, while the second column presents the z- score to determine how 
statistically significantly different from zero each coefficient is. The parameter 휙, reflecting the speed of 
adjustment, is also included to illustrate the speed at which the model converges to the long- run equilib-
rium. Imposing homogeneity on the long- run coefficients creates an upward bias in the size of the coef-
ficient of the lagged dependent variable Ri,t - 1 (Pesaran et al., 1999). As a consequence, the MG estimate 
of the adjustment speed is larger than that of the PMG approach.23 Another consequence of imposing 
this long- run homogeneity is a reduction in the standard errors of the long- run coefficients.
Under the assumption of long- term homogeneity in the slope coefficients, the coefficients of ex-
pected inflation and output have the expected sign and are significantly different from zero at the 1% 
level. However, the marginal effect of government ideology conditional on CBD is only significantly 
different from zero and positive at a minimum level of CDB (Table 4). In other words, if it assumed 
22Stata command xtpmg is used, with options “pmg” and “mg” in each case. Table E1 shows the full model estimates. 



















T A B L E  3  The impact of ideology on forward- looking monetary policy
PMG MG
Coefficient z- Value Coefficient z- Value
Long- run relation
 Ideology 0.893*** 4.04 −0.396 −0.4
 Central Bank Dependence 
(CBD)
0.165 0.41 0.184 0.7
 CBD*Ideology −0.535* −1.87 −2.517 −1.20
  (Expected) Output gap 3.223*** 5.29 1.617* 1.88
  (Expected) Inflation 2.628*** 11.2 1.872** 2.24
Error correction speed −0.090*** −6.59 −0.214*** −5.55
Number of N 21 21
Observations 935 935
Period 1989/2005 1989/2005
Notes. Heterogeneous panel. Error correction model dependent variable: short- term interest rate (annualized quarterly percentage). 
CBD is central bank dependence (ranging from 0 to 1), Ideology ranges from 1 (strong right) to 5 (strong left), Output gap is the annual-
ized percentage long- term GDP growth gap, and Inflation is the annualized quarterly consumer inflation rate. Pesaran’s Pooled Mean 
Group and Mean Group estimators are obtained in STATA using xtpmg command. If ideology and central bank dependence interact, 
the data are normalized. Statistical significance: *significant at 10%; **at 5%; ***at 1%.
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that the slope coefficients are homogeneous in the long term, interest rates are higher under left- wing 
administrations but only if the forward- looking central bank is highly independent.
However, under the assumption of heterogeneity in the slope coefficients, only the two traditional 
components of the Taylor rule are different from zero (MG). The impact of expected inflation on the 
interest rate is larger than one, in line with the Taylor principle. When analyzed independently, ideol-
ogy and central bank dependence do no enter this model with coefficients statistically different from 
zero. On average, when all countries have different slope coefficients, no partisan effect is present as 
shown in the second column of Table 4.
As the results of the PMG and the MG estimators clearly differ, it is important to decide which es-
timator should be preferred. Therefore, a Hausman specification test on the null hypothesis of homo-
geneous slope coefficients is performed (Hausman, 1978). This test compares an estimator b that is 
known to be consistent with an estimator B that is efficient under the assumption being tested. The null 
hypothesis is that the estimator is an efficient (and consistent) estimator of the true parameters, and its 
test statistic is Chi- squared distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the number of slope coeffi-
cients being compared. Under the null hypothesis of homogeneity, both the mean group and the pooled 
mean group estimators are expected to provide asymptotically consistent estimates. In turn, the PMG 
estimates will be inconsistent under the alternative hypothesis of heterogeneity. The test results suggest 
that the null is rejected, albeit only at the 10% level, which implies that all slope coefficients are het-
erogeneous across countries and the MG estimator is to be preferred.24 In light of this evidence, we 
conclude that our preferred estimates do not suggest the presence of a partisan effect in monetary 
policy.
5 |  STRATEGIC CENTRAL BANKS?
Clark and Arel- Bundock (2013) argue that there are systematic differences in Fed behavior under 
Republican and Democratic presidents since the U.S. central bank became operationally independent 
in 1951. Their evidence suggests that the Fed’s policy instrument, the Federal Funds Rate, responds 
to the inflation rate only when Democrats are in the White House and up for re- election: The Federal 
Reserve is a conditional inflation hawk, that is, it cares about inflation, but only when the President is 
a Democrat and in the close vicinity of an election date. The underlying theoretical reasoning is that 
the preferences of the Republic Party are closer to those of the Fed than those of the Democratic Party. 
As a consequence, the central bank has an incentive to behave strategically: “central bankers in such 
a world face an intertemporal tradeoff when right- wing governments are in power. They can push for 
the policy closest to their ideal point knowing that doing so hinders the right- wing party’s prospects 
of reelection, or they can accept a more expansionary policy now in exchange for an increase in the 
24Test statistic of 9.31 with a p- value equal to 0.097. 
T A B L E  4  Marginal effects of ideology on interest rate conditional on central bank dependence allowing for 
heterogeneity
PMG MG
Minimum CBD 1.835*** (0.545) 4.039 (4.245)
Average CBD 0.912 (0.221) −0.305 (1.031)
Maximum CBD −0.005 (0.532) −4.626 (3.213)
Notes. See notes to Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance: *significant at 10%; **at 5%; ***at 1%.
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probability that the government in power during non- electoral times will be closer to its ideal point. 
In contrast, when left- wing parties are in power, a conservative central banker faces no such dilemma. 
Political preferences align with the Fed’s well publicized commitment to price stability, since the 
political consequence of following through on that commitment is an increase in the probability that 
a government with an ideal point closer to its own will get elected. Thus, we can expect independent 
central banks to act like conservative independent central banks—but only when left- wing govern-
ments are in power.” (Clark & Arel- Bundock, 2013, p. 5).
Based on the findings of the previous sections, and within the framework of our multicountry anal-
ysis, we test this hypothesis by computing the mean group estimators of our preferred forward- looking 
Taylor rule for two subsamples, namely countries above and below the median level of CBD. We in-
troduce a new dummy variable (Before_elec) which equals one for periods before the main elections 
in each country of our sample.25 This new variable and an interaction between it and government 
ideology are added as explanatory variables to our initial model.26 We have also normalized the vari-
ables included in the interaction terms to facilitate the interpretation of the results. The hypothesis that 
the effect of government ideology on interest rates being conditional on the electoral calendar implies 
a positive marginal effect on higher values of government ideology before the election (i.e., under 
left- wing governments), but only when the central bank is not dependent (conservative). The results 
of this new specification of the model are presented in Table 5 and no marginal effect is statistically 
significantly different from zero at any level of confidence. Our estimates do not provide support for 
this hypothesis.
As a robustness check, we also run an alternative specification of the model in which we do not 
split the sample and incorporate a triple interaction term between the variables CBD, government 
ideology, and the election variable.27 Considering three different levels of CBD in this new specifica-
tion (minimum, average, and maximum), we still find that the marginal effects of ideology on the in-
terest rate conditional on our election variable are not significantly different from zero (Table 6).28
6 |  CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our results do not provide robust evidence for the presence of a traditional partisan effect on mon-
etary policy. In contrast to the standard assumption used in previous research, our evidence suggests 
that the influence of government ideology on the interest rate cannot be assumed to be equal across 
large samples of countries. The preferred estimation method in the literature, fixed- effect panels, can 
therefore only be used for smaller samples of similar countries without creating any biases, but even 
25The methodology for constructing this variable is presented in Appendix G. 
26See Equation 2 for the base model. The terms CBD and ID × CBD are not included in the estimates shown in Table 5, but a 
regression including these terms provides similar conclusions. 
27We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
28Table F1 and F2 in Appendix F present the complete estimation results. 
T A B L E  5  Marginal effects of ideology on interest rate conditional on election date allowing for heterogeneity
Countries with low CBD Countries with high CBD
After election (Before_elec=0) 0.135 (0.46) −0.526 (0.88)
Before election (Before_elec=1) −1.673 (1.15) −0.086 (1.51)
Notes. See notes to Table 3. Interacted variables are normalized. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance: *significant at 
10%; **at 5%; ***at 1%.
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in that case the policy of a forward- looking central bank is not affected as predicted by partisan theory. 
In this case, the empirical evidence points toward higher interest rates under left- wing governments. 
This effect, however, only appears at higher levels of central bank independence.
This paper also introduces heterogeneous estimators of the forward- looking monetary rule as an alterna-
tive to the pooled methods. As central banks are forward- looking, the approach employed in previous stud-
ies, that is, to use (ex post) backward- looking data, is not realistic. Under the assumption of forward- looking 
behavior, the results suggest heterogeneity in the long- run coefficients and only the mean group estimator 
should therefore be considered. In this case, we do not find a partisan effect and a traditional Taylor rule 
incorporating forecasts of inflation and the output gap prevails. In contrast to our estimates of backward- 
looking Taylor rules, our estimates for forward- looking Taylor rules adhere to the Taylor principle.
In a nutshell, our results suggest that the empirical finding in previous studies that interest rates are 
lower under left- wing administrations is caused by using the same and unrealistic (i.e., backward- looking) 
Taylor model in panels of countries. When country heterogeneity and a forward- looking central bank be-
havior are considered, there is no clear evidence in support of a partisan effect on monetary policy. Using 
our preferred models, we also tested the hypothesis that independent central banks assign more importance 
to inflation only when left- wing governments are in office and elections are near. Our results do not lend 
support to this theory.
We also do not find support for the view put forward by Clark and Arel- Bundock (2013) that 
central banks are conditional inflation hawks, that is, they care about inflation, but only when the 
government is left- wing and in the close vicinity of an election date. There are several potential expla-
nations for why we do not confirm the findings of Clark and Arel- Bundock (2013). First, we are not 
focusing the analysis solely on the case of the United States, but on a group of more diverse developed 
countries in which the convenient separation between “Democrats” and “Republicans” is not possible 
anymore. Second, our estimation methodology is different and a bit more complex than the ordinary 
least squares method used in that paper. We use a mean group estimator that allows for slope hetero-
geneity (Pesaran & Smith, 1995; Pesaran et al.,1999). This estimator also controls for potential biases 
in the dynamic specification of the model. Third, we consider real- time forward- looking information 
of both inflation and output gap in our model. Finally, the period of data covered in our analysis is not 
the same as in Clark and Arel- Bundock (2013). Their analysis starts in the 1950s and covers periods 
of time in which some of the main variables experienced higher volatility than in more recent times.
Despite its innovations, our study has also limitations. The most important one is that we follow 
previous studies by assuming that central bank independence is exogenous. In the short term, this 
seems a reasonable assumption but in the longer term government ideology may affect the level of 
central bank independence, be it via a traditional partisan effect (right- wing governments favor CBI) 
or a credibility enhancing effect (left- wing governments favor CBI). We leave this issue for future 
research.
T A B L E  6  Marginal effects of ideology on interest rate conditional on election date, CBD, and allowing for 
heterogeneity









Notes. See notes to Table 3. Interacted variables are normalized. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Furthermore, we have not considered the role of fiscal policy. Theoretically the stance of fiscal 
policy may be driven by ideological factors and the central bank may respond to the fiscal stance. 
However, empirical evidence does not clearly suggest that the stance of fiscal policy is driven by 
partisan factors. In his survey of partisan influence, Potrafke (2017, p. 739) concludes: “Empirical 
evidence on deficit spending is ambiguous and does not clearly indicate that left- wing governments 
increased public debt and budget deficits.”
In addition, our sample period ends in 2005 as we wanted our study to be comparable with pre-
vious research. Future work could expand the sample period, by combining money market rates and 
shadow rates. The latter is needed to take the effective lower bound into account. As pointed out by 
Claus, Claus, and Krippner (2016), the shadow short rate is a synthetic summary measure that is 
derived from yield curve data and essentially reflects the degree to which intermediate and longer 
maturity interest rates are lower than would be expected if a zero policy rate prevailed in the absence 
of unconventional policy measures. This measure is better at capturing the stance of monetary policy, 
especially in the effective lower bound (ELB) period when several central banks started their quanti-
tative easing programs. The shadow rate incorporates this information.
Another important issue for future research is the possibility that central bank behavior may be 
asymmetric (see, for instance, Brüggemann & Riedel, 2011). Central bank reaction functions (and the 
reaction coefficients contained therein) can, for instance, be different in periods of expansionary and 
contractionary monetary policy (see, for instance, Beckmann, Belke, & Dreger, 2016). However, it is 
important that in examining these issues the reaction functions of central banks are estimated using 
real- time and forward- looking data.
Also, traditional Taylor rule models can be adjusted to account for international spillovers (see, 
for instance, Beckmann et al., 2016). According to Taylor (2013), central banks no longer decide on 
policy rates in an independent way but policy reactions have been increasingly affected by the interna-
tional environment since then. It would be interesting to examine whether accounting for international 
spillovers has affected the extent to which political factors influence central bank policies, notably so 
for a more recent sample period than the one used in the present study.
Finally, as there is some evidence that party affiliation affects central bank governors’ policies 
(Neuenkirch & Neumaier, 2015), it would be interesting to examine this issue for the central banks in 
our sample, again using forward- looking Taylor rule models.
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Table A1 presents summary statistics of the variables used for the backward- looking analysis ranging from 1980Q4 to 2005Q4. 
Table A2 shows summary statistics of the variables used in the forward- looking analysis for the period starting in 1989Q4. 
Table A3 shows variation in CBD.
Table A1 Descriptive statistics 1980–2005a
Variable Observations Mean SD Min Max
Interest rateb 1,964 9.0 5.2 0.02 37.7
Inflationb 2,064 5.7 7.5 −1.4 95.4
GDP gapc 2,020 −0.1 1.5 −7.1 6.8
Ideologyd 2,064 2.9 0.9 1.0 4.0
Central Bank 
Dependencee
1,984 0.5 0.2 0.06 0.81
Notes. a Sample of 23 countries for which backward- looking information is available.b Annual percentage rate. c As percentage of trend 
output. d Scale 1–5, representing ideologies from right wing to left wing. e Scale 0–1, represents the inverse of CBI. 
Table A2 Descriptive statistics 1989–2005a
Variable Observations Mean SD Min Max
Interest rateb 1,060 6.7 4.3 0.02 24.0
Inflationb 1,065 2.9 2.8 −1.4 23.4
GDP gapc 1,060 −0.1 1.3 −7.0 6.8
Expected inflation 1- yearb 961 2.9 1.9 −1.1 12.3
Expected GDP gap 1- yearb 961 −0.3 1.0 −3.3 2.2
(Cotinues)
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Variable Observations Mean SD Min Max
Ideologyd 1,065 3.0 0.9 1.0 4.0
Central Bank Dependencee 1,065 0.4 0.2 0.06 0.81
Notes. a Sample of 21 countries for which forward- looking information is available.b Annual percentage rate. c Percentage of trend 
output. d Scale 1–5, representing ideologies from right wing to left wing. e Scale 0–1, represents the inverse of CBI. 
Table A3 Variation in central bank dependence
Mean SD Min Max.
Overall 0.373 0.235 0.06 0.810
Between — 0.137 0.143 0.641
Within — 0.194 −0.018 0.794
Note. Total of 1,365 observations with 21 cross sections and 65 periods.
APPENDIX B
Poolability test
Table B1 presents the results of the poolability test for dynamic panels suggested by Baltagi (2008) and Baltagi and Griffin 
(1997) for the samples used in Table 1. The null hypothesis is that of homogeneity of the slope coefficients. The results in Table 
B1 indicate that for the full sample of 23 countries used to estimate a backward- looking Taylor rule the assumption of homo-
geneity does not hold. For the other samples used in Table 1, the hypothesis of homogeneity cannot be rejected.









F- value 1.82 0.62 1.18 0.7
Critical F at 1% 1.32 1.39 1.43 1.36
Outcome Rejected Not rejected Not rejected Not rejected
Countries 23 16 15 21
Observations b 1,841 1,340 791 895
Notes. a Implemented mainly through the ivregress command in STATA. These statistics may be affected by the instability of the indi-
vidual country regressions. The F- statistic is based on the absolute value of the difference between the sum of squares of the restricted 
and the unrestricted models as stated in section 3. b Due to the particularities of the different tests used, the final number of observations 
in each column might not necessarily be the same as its corresponding results in Table 1. 
Table A2 (Continued)
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APPENDIX C
Sensitivity analysis
As an additional sensitivity check, we have dropped each country from the sample in the backward- looking analysis as reported 
in column (1) in Table 1. Table C1 presents some of the results. It is clear from Table C1 that when countries such as Iceland, 
Greece, Portugal, or Spain are removed, the size and statistical significance of the slope coefficients change, confirming our 
conclusion that the sample is not homogeneous.
Table C1 The impact of government ideology on monetary policy without selected countries
Backward- looking I No ISL No GRC No PRT No ESP
Ideology −0.018 −0.005 0.004 −0.015 −0.020
Central Bank 
Dependence
0.164*** 0.170*** 0.152*** 0.182*** 0.179***
CBD*Ideology −0.063** −0.072** −0.048* −0.069 −0.058*
Output gap 0.122*** 0.109*** 0.129*** 0110*** 0.103***
Inflation 0.111*** 0.131*** 0.322*** 0.249*** 0.260***
Lagged Dep. Var. 0.786*** 0.892*** 0.806*** 0.822*** 0.831***
Number of N 23 22 22 22 22
Observations 1,884 1,810 1,801 1,809 1,808
Notes. See notes to Table 1. Iceland, ISL; Greece, GRC; Portugal, PRT; Spain, ESP; Italy, ITA.
More importantly, the marginal effect of ideology on the monetary policy variable loses relevance when some specific countries are 
excluded. Table C2 presents a clear example of this fact. After excluding Greece, government ideology no longer affects the short- term 
interest rate, regardless of the value of CBD (cf. Belke & Potrafke, 2012).
Table C2 Marginal effects of ideology on interest rate excluding Greece (conditional on CDB)
Minimum CBD 0.107* (0.066)
Average CBD 0.005 (0.252)
Maximum CBD −0.065 (0.066)
Note. See notes to Table 1. Standard errors in parentheses.
These results show that the presence of a traditional partisan effect in the monetary policy is sensitive to the inclusion (exclusion) of 
specific countries into (out of) the analysis, which can be a signal of heterogeneity in the slope coefficients.
APPENDIX D
Adjustments to the sample size
In order to reassure that the conclusions drawn from comparing the results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 are not driven by dif-
ferent sample sizes, we have conducted additional adjustments in order to obtain the exact same number of observations in both 
models. This was only possible at the expense of reducing the available number of observations and cross sections.29 As Table 
D1 shows, using these samples yields similar results as reported in Table 2.






Central Bank Dependence 0.149*** 0.145***
CBD*Ideology −0.088*** −0.080***
(Expected) Output gap 0.111*** 0.047
29Australia is excluded from the samples. 
(Continues)





(Expected) Inflation 0.011 0.061
Lagged Dep. Var. 0.890*** 0.895***
Number of countries 14 14
Observations 723 723
Marginal effects
 Minimum CBD 0.195*** (0.058) 0.196*** (0.060)
 Average CBD 0.052* (0.028) 0.065** (0.029)
 Maximum CBD −0.103* (0.056) −0.074 (0.055)
Note. See notes to Tables 1 and 2.
APPENDIX E
Mean Group average long- run effect
In the context of the MG model proposed in Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran et al. (1999),
휆i and 훽i are varying across groups according to the specification given in Equation 4:
where 휉1i and 휉2i are assumed to have zero means and constant covariances. This is a standard formulation of the RCM and it 
introduces heterogeneity through the ‘short- term’ coefficients 휆iand 훽i. If the long- run effects, 휃i=훽i∕(1−휆i), and the mean 
lags, 휓i=휆i∕(1−휆i), also vary randomly across groups with zero mean and constant covariances, then:
In other words, the ‘average’ long- run effects of the regressors can now be defined either in terms of the ‘average’ of the short- 




, or the average of the long- run ones, ?̄? (Pesaran & Smith, 1995). If N→∞, the two estima-
tors converge and ?̄? becomes the appropriate measure of the average long- run effect.
Table E1 presents the complete results for the regressions shown in Table 3.
Table E1 Regression results. Heterogeneous estimators. Forward- looking central bank
PMG MG
Coefficient z- Value Coefficient z- Value
Long run
 Ideology 0.893*** 4.04 −0.396 −0.4
 Central Bank 
Dependence
0.165 0.41 0.184 0.7
 CBD*Ideology −0.535* −1.87 −2.517 −1.20
 Output gap 3.223*** 5.29 1.617* 1.88
 Inflation 2.628*** 11.2 1.872** 2.24





























   | 237GIESENOW aNd DE HaaN
PMG MG
Coefficient z- Value Coefficient z- Value
 D. Ideology −0.024 −0.09 0.293 1.3
 D. Central Bank 
Depend.
0.045 0.82 −0.037 −0.45
 D. CBD*Ideology 0.485* 1.7 0.574* 1.79
 D. Output gap −0.011 −0.09 −0.012 −0.07
D. Inflation −0.043 −0.34 −0.026 −0.21
Number of N 21  21  
Observations 935 935
Notes. Long- term dependent variable: short- term interest rate. Ideology and central bank dependence interacted (normalized). Statistical 
significance: *significant at 10%; **at 5%; ***at 1%.
APPENDIX F
Mean Group average long- run estimators for testing Clark and Arel- Bundock’s hypothesis.
Table F1 presents the regressions used to obtain the marginal effects shown in Table 5.
Table F1 The role of elections. Mean group estimators with a forward- looking central bank
Low CBD High CBD
Coefficient z- Value Coefficient z- Value
Long- run
 Ideology −1.673 −1.44 −0.086 −0.06
 (Expected) Output gap 2.828*** 4.32 1.773** 2.44
 (Expected) Inflation 1.946** 2.25 1.319 0.71
 Before_elec −1.477 −0.96 −3.447** −2.27
 Ideology*Before_elec 1.807* 1.86 −0.439 −0.33
Error correction speed −0.174*** −3.00 −0.232*** −4.40
Number of N 11 10
Observations 503 432
Notes. Long- term dependent variable: short- term interest rate. Ideology and expected inflation interacted (normalized). Inflation and 
Output gap figures are forward looking. Statistical significance: *significant at 10%; **at 5%; ***at 1%.
Table F2 presents the results of running an alternative specification of our model with a triple interaction term between government 
ideology, CBD, and the time of elections. These figures are the base for computing the marginal effects shown in Table 6.
T a b l e  E 1  (Continued)
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Table F2 Alternative specification with triple interaction. Mean group estimators with forward- looking central bank
 Coefficient z- Value
Long- run
 Ideology 1.112 0.38
 Central Bank dependence (CBD) 0.448** 2.13
 Ideology*CBD −6.189 −1.19
 Expected inflation 1.071 0.76
 Output gap 0.871 0.73
 Before_elec −4.470** −2.05
 CBD*Before_elec 0.115 0.28
 Ideology*Before_elec 0.941 0.43
 Ideology*Before_elec*CBD 2.518 1.57
Error correction speed −0.257*** −5.52
Number of N 21
Observations 935
Notes. Long- term dependent variable: short- term interest rate. Ideology and expected inflation interacted (normalized). Inflation and 
Output gap figures are forward looking. Statistical significance: *significant at 10%; **at 5%; ***at 1%.
APPENDIX G
Variable “Before_elec” for testing Clark and Arel- Bundock’s hypothesis
The “Before_elec” variable is a dummy variable. For each country, the historical average number of periods between elections is 
calculated. This figure is divided then by two and the outcome will be called “half- term”, which is expressed in quarters (see Table 
G1). The variable “Before_elec” equals 1 in those cases for which after an election the number of periods exceeds the half- term. 
This is in order to avoid the uncertainty attached to the election date in many parliamentary systems. For countries in which the 
president is the major political figure or where no prime minister is elected, such as France, Portugal, and the United States, only 
the presidential elections are considered.30 Election dates come from the election reports of the Inter- Parliamentary Union (IPU).
Table G1 Summary of elections—Period 1989Q4 to 2005Q4




AUS 6 65 5
AUT 5 65 6
BEL 4 65 8
CAN 4 65 8
CHE 4 65 8
DEU 5 65 6
DNK 5 65 6
ESP 5 65 6
FIN 4 65 8
FRA* 2 65 16
GBR 4 65 8
30Considering parliamentary elections for these particular countries instead does change neither the results nor the conclusions. 
Results are available on request. 
(Continues)
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GRC 6 65 5
IRL 3 65 10
ITA 4 65 8
JPN 6 65 5
NLD 4 65 8
NOR 4 65 8
NZL 6 65 5
PRT* 3 65 10
SWE 4 65 8
USA* 4 65 8
Notes. Average half- term calculation does not include the election period. Average half- term figures have been rounded.* Presidential 
elections considered. 
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